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Device Pairing for D2D-Enabled Mobile
Crowdsourcing
Cong Zhao, Shusen Yang, Xinyu Yang, and Julie McCann
Abstract—Mobile Crowdsourcing is a promising service paradigm utilizing ubiquitous mobile devices to facilitate large-scale
crowdsourcing tasks (e.g. urban sensing and collaborative computing). Many applications in this domain require Device-to-Device
(D2D) communications between participating devices for interactive operations such as task collaborations and file transmissions.
Considering the private participating devices and their opportunistic encountering behaviors, it is highly desired to establish secure and
trustworthy D2D connections in a fast and autonomous way, which is vital for implementing practical Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems
(MCSs). In this paper, we develop an efficient scheme, Trustworthy Device Pairing (TDP), which achieves user-transparent secure D2D
connections and reliable peer device selections for trustworthy D2D communications. Through rigorous analysis, we demonstrate the
effectiveness and security intensity of TDP in theory. The performance of TDP is evaluated based on both real-world prototype
experiments and extensive trace-driven simulations. Evaluation results verify our theoretical analysis and show that TDP significantly
outperforms existing approaches in terms of pairing speed, stability, and security.
Index Terms—Mobile Crowdsourcing, D2D Communications, User-Transparent Pairing, Trustworthiness.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
SMART mobile devices have promoted the proliferationof Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs), which facili-
tates large-scale crowdsouring tasks by exploiting the capac-
ities of ubiquitous mobile users in a collaborative way [1].
Typical MCS applications include mobile crowdsensing [2],
[3], [4], [5], information searching [6], crowdsourced content
caching and sharing [4], [5], and collaborative mobile could
computing [7], [8], etc. Many of these applications require
exploiting the collaborative interactions among individu-
al participants in geographical proximity. For instance, in
collaborative searching applications (e.g. finding a missing
child [6]), local searching results are required to be shared
among surrounding participators.
Such geographically proximal interactions can be
achieved by using Device-to-Device (D2D) communication
(e.g. WiFi direct and Bluetooth), which is much more agile
and cost-effective compared with using traditional cellular
networks, due to its shorter transmission delay, lower power
consumption, and ignorable financial cost [4], [9]. For in-
stance, in D2D-enabled mobile crowdsensing systems [4],
[10], [11], [12], a participating mobile user can report his
or her sensory data to the server via other participating
phones through opportunistic D2D transmissions rather
than through cellular communications directly, which sig-
nificantly improves the network throughput and reduces
the system financial cost. It has also been shown that D2D
communication is promising in cellular traffic offloading in
crowdsourced video streaming [1], [2] and content sharing
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in mobile social networking [5]. In addition, D2D communi-
cations are considered as the fundamental communication
infrastructure in more and more emerging mobile could
computing architectures [6], [7].
There exist an increasing number of efforts from both
academia and industry to develop D2D related communica-
tion techniques, including efficient neighbor discovery [13],
secure device pairing [14], [15], [16], D2D enabled cellular
networks [17], incentivisation for D2D communications [4],
[9], [18], and D2D standards such as WiFi direct, Bluetooth
Smart, and LTE direct. However, these approaches cannot
be directly applied to achieve D2D-enabled MCSs, because
they cannot simultaneously satisfy the following three re-
quirements in practice:
1. Secure D2D Connection. Since participating devices
are privately held and temporarily recruited, there is no
prior trust relation between them. Therefore, establishing
a shared secret key for the firstly encountered devices (i.e.
device pairing) is vital for secure collaborative interactions.
2. Rapid and User-Transparent Connection. Due to
the opportunistic human contact behaviors, it is highly
desired to achieve rapid, autonomous, and user-transparent
device pairing processes. However, existing device pairing
approaches are based on either physical interactions (e.g.
button clicks) between firstly encountered devices or com-
mon contextual information gathered gradually [15], [16],
and are therefore unsuitable for practical MCSs.
3. Addressing Peer Diversity. In a MCS, a participating
device could have multiple potential D2D peer devices
and need to choose the optimal one (or a set of optimal
ones). This optimization decision should depend on the
trustworthiness and other metrics (e.g. transmission data
rate) of each candidate. As a result, a mechanism estimating
the trustworthiness of a certain device as a D2D peer is
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXX 2
necessary to guarantee the quality of D2D communications.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we present both theoretical and practical
studies to simultaneously achieve above three requirements.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
 We develop Trustworthy Device Pairing (TDP), the
first device pairing scheme for trustworthy op-
portunistic D2D communications in MCSs. TDP
achieves rapid and user-transparent device paring,
which is not supported by the off-the-shelf protocols
or state-of-art user-transparent approaches, without
introducing extra pairing labors. In addition, TDP
introduces a new trust management method for reli-
able peer device selections based on online trustwor-
thiness estimation of D2D peers.
 Through rigorous security analysis, we demonstrate
that TDP is immune to six potential security threats,
including Passive Eavesdropping attacks, Impersonating
attacks,Man-in-the-Middle attacks, Trust Forging attack-
s, Independent Negative Attacks, and Collusive attacks.
Particularly, besides guaranteeing a comparable se-
curity intensity to the off-the-shelf protocols, TDP
can also resist the Traffic-Oriented attacks that are
detrimental to D2D communications in MCSs.
 We implement TDP in the Android operating sys-
tem and the OMNeT++ simulator, and conduct real-
world experiments and extensive trace-driven simu-
lations to evaluate the performance of TDP. Result-
s demonstrate that TDP significantly outperforms
existing approaches in terms of pairing speed and
stability, and it can effectively eliminate the impact
of Traffic-Oriented attacks in D2D-enabled MCSs.
1.2 Paper Organization
The next section presents related work. Section 3 presents
the system model. The device trust estimation method
in D2D-enabled MCSs is presented in Section 4. Section
5 presents the Trustworthy Device Pairing scheme. Real-
world experiments and extensive simulations are discussed
in Section 6. And we conclude this paper in Section 7. Dis-
cussions on parameter determinations and security proofs
are placed in Appendices A and B respectively, which can
be found in the supplemental material.
2 RELATED WORK
D2D Communications: There exist a large body of D2D
communication based schemes, including efficient neighbor
discovery [13], D2D-enabled cellular networks [17], incen-
tivisation for D2D [4], [9], [18], network protocols [19], [20],
etc. Among those, the work [4], [9], [21] specifically consider
MCSs with D2D communications. However, none of these
work considers security issues.
Device Pairing: Device pairing focuses on establishing
shared keys between freshly encountered devices. Some
approaches [22], [23], [24], [25] rely on user-interactions
to distribute initial trust credentials. However, in D2D-
enabled MCSs, mobile users are normally strangers who
are unlikely to conduct physical interactions. Since user-
transparency is more preferable for spontaneous pairing,
the proximity-based approach [14], [15], [16] attracts sig-
nificant attentions, which authenticates adjacent devices
leveraging locally sensed contextual information. However,
this approach commonly assumes that adversaries have no
sustained access to legal contextual information, which is
not acceptable for highly open MCSs. One of the most
relevant work is the non-interactive device pairing approach
in [26], which, however, requires asynchronous broadcast-
ing of public credentials that may lead to unpredictable
pairing time fluctuations. In summary, none of No existing
device pairing approach can achieve both secure and user-
transparent D2D connections, as our TDP.
Trust Management: For participatory distributed sys-
tems, trust management is an effective approach to en-
hance system performance by determining the potential
gain of self-interested entities according to their trustwor-
thiness [27], [28]. In traditional P2P systems, the trust
framework is usually applied for either enabling access
control [29] or encouraging benign resource sharing [30].
SepRep [31] establishes a general Quality-of-Service (QoS)
based trust framework for heterogeneous P2P networks. For
mobile P2P networks, [32] proposes M-trust for accurate,
robust and light-weight trust rating aggregation. In prolif-
erating MCS applications, existing trust frameworks [33],
[34] mainly focus on evaluating the participator contribution
from the data quality perspective. In [35], a reputation-based
trust framework is used to estimate the trustworthiness
of a mobile device in location authentications, which is
collaboratively conducted by proximal devices using Blue-
tooth communications. Overall, existing approaches main-
tain application-specific trustworthiness for self-interested
entities, which is usually estimated using upper-level met-
rics without considering link-layer constrains. They cannot
be directly used to evaluate the trustworthiness of D2D
communications in MCSs.
The workshop abstract [36] presents the very initial
idea of our TDP, while this paper establishes a much
more complete and systematic trust management scheme
with comprehensive theoretical analysis. Furthermore, real-
world experiments and extensive trace-driven simulations
are also conducted to study the practical performance of
TDP in realistic D2D-enabled MCSs.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the model of general D2D-
enabled MCSs and potential attacks to opportunistic D2D
communications.
3.1 D2D-enabled MCS Architecture
The typical architecture of a D2D-enabled MCS is shown
in Fig.1: multiple participating personal mobile devices
communicate with the Backend Server (BS) through the
Internet via WiFi or cellular access points, and they commu-
nicate with devices opportunistically encountered through
outband D2D radios such as Bluetooth and WiFi direct.
Generally, the BS is responsible for the maintenance of
the entire MCS by establishing system regulations, pub-
lishing crowdsourcing applications, publishing tasks and
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Fig. 1: Architecture of D2D-Enabled MCSs.
recording device profiles. Let N be the set of all regulated
MCS task types (e.g. mobile social networking, crowdsens-
ing, collaborative computing).
To participate in crowdsourcing tasks, personal mobile
devices need to install the crowdsourcing application and
register to the BS. Let D be the set of all registered de-
vices. Driven by a specific crowdsourcing task, any pair of
registered devices can establish a secure D2D connection
for further communications, which is denoted as a D2D
transaction for the rest of the paper. A device a 2 D can
have a sequence of D2D transactions i = f1; 2; :::g with any
other device in D.
For the establishment of secure D2D connections, each
device a 2 D possesses a unique device pairing credential,
which is verifiable to both the BS and any other registered
device encountered. Meanwhile, a ‘trustvalue’ is maintained
for each device according to its behavior in previous D2D
transactions, which is treats as its trustworthiness to fulfill
future transaction requests. Here, the ‘trustvalue’ is the
predominant concern of the peer selection when there are
multiple candidates.
3.2 Security Threats and Attack Models
Considering the sensitivity of personal mobile devices, nei-
ther devices opportunistically encountered nor the BS should be
fully trusted in MCSs.
Intuitively, potential attacks launched by malicious de-
vices within the D2D-enabled MCS can be divided into two
categories: Connection-Oriented (CO) attacks and Traffic-
Oriented (TO) attacks. On one hand, CO attackers intend
to compromise the pairing process between encountered
devices for illegal communication contents or MCS services.
In fact, the prevention of CO attacks is the predominant
concentration of security mechanism of off-the-shelf D2D
communication protocols (e.g Bluetooth [25] and WiFi di-
rect [24]). On the other hand, the TO attackers are more
interested in manipulating D2D traffics in MCSs for simply
unfair rewards (e.g. popularity, credits) or future advanced
attacks (e.g. false data injection attacks). Unlike CO attacks,
as far as we know, there is still no systematic discussion on
the impact and prevention of TO attacks in MCSs from the
perspective of opportunistic D2D communications.
We formally model these potential attacks as follows (let
there be devices a; b;m 2 D):
1. Passvie-Eavesdropping Attack (CO1): any third party
adversary m, who is not the intended end a or b of a D2D
transaction, tries to decrypt eavesdropped data;
2. Impersonating Attack (CO2): any adversarym, except
the device impersonated a, tries to use a’s credential to
establish D2D connections with others;
3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack (CO3): any third party
adversary m, except both ends of a D2D transaction a and
b, tries to intercept and replace a (b)’s credential to establish
D2D connections with b (a) in middle without being noticed;
4. Trust Forging Attack (TO1): any adversary m forges
its trustvalue to attract unfair D2D transaction requests;
5. Independent Negative Attack (TO2): any adversary
m intentionally replies negative ratings (continuously or
intermittently) to downgrade others’ trustvalue and conse-
quently attract unfair D2D transaction requests;
6. Collusive Attack (TO3): any set of adversariesM in-
tentionally reply positive ratings to members withinM and
negative ratings to others (continuously or intermittently) to
attract unfair D2D transaction requests.
Moreover, we should treat the BS as ‘benign but curious’:
generally, it will jeopardize neither the device pairing nor
trust management process for public credibility; meanwhile,
it is curious about the content of D2D transactions among
devices. In this case, the BS may try to launch CO1 attacks
as a third party adversary.
4 DEVICE TRUST ESTIMATION IN D2D-ENABLED
MCSS
In D2D-enabled MCSs, the reliability of a device to fulfill
future D2D requests can be reflected by its behavior in his-
torical transactions. In this paper, we denote this reliability
as the trustworthiness of a device, which is treated as the
basic metric for the peer selection in device pairing process
(will be discussed latter).
In this section, we develop an online method to: (1) accu-
rately estimate the trustworthiness of participating devices
according to their historical behaviors; (2) selectively profile
the device behavior during D2D transactions; (3) adjust the
device trustworthiness using behavior profiles at real-time.
4.1 Device Trustworthiness
We use the term of ‘trustvalue’ to quantitatively represent
the trustworthiness of each device, and, for the authenticity
concern, it can only be adjusted by the BS after each trans-
action according to the device behavior.
Mathematically, let the trustvalue of each device a 2 D
after its ith D2D transaction be a jN j-dimensional vector
ta(i). Here, the value of the nth (1 6 n 6 jN j) entry of ta(i)
is a value within the range of [0; 1], which represents the
trustworthiness of a fulfilling the nth type of D2D request
(for the corresponding type of MCS task).
Since the trustworthiness of a device should be gradually
built over a period of benign behaviors, we use the widely-
adopted Gompertz function [37] in reputation mapping to
compute the device trustvalue:
ta(i) = G(G
 1(ta(i  1)) + ta(i)); (1)
where, for a given vector x, G(x) denotes calculating the
value of the Gompertz function:
g(x) = e e
 cgx
(2)
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for each entry of vector x, and the parameter cg determines
the sensitivity of trustvalue variation along time. ta(i) is
the estimation of a’s behavior at its ith transaction, which is
computed by the BS according to behavior profiles uploaded
by participating devices (will be explained later).
4.2 Device Behavior Profiling during D2D Transactions
For each D2D transaction, both ends of the transaction
profile necessary information that can objectively reflect
each other’s behavior, which is then recorded in a D2D
receipt respectively for future trustvalue adjustment at the
BS. Intuitively, for a reasonable profiling of the ith D2D
transaction of a device a 2 D (with its peer device b),
the following four factors should be recorded in a’s receipt
(omitting index i for concision): the Quality-of-Service (QoS)
provided by the D2D link qab, the credibility of b from a’s
perspective cab, the rating from b on a’s behavior rba, and
the type of the current transaction a. Following is their
specific definitions.
QoS: We use the link-layer QoS value qab to denote
the quality of the D2D link constructed by a given pair of
encountered devices a and b. Different QoS metrics are used
according to different D2D transactions, such as transmis-
sion delay, data rate, or packet loss rate. For example, image-
based applications would require high data rate, while
event-monitoring tasks need small delay. In our system, qab
is a normalized value that can be obtained by both a and b
during their transactions.
We use link-layer QoS because it can precisely reflect
the application-layer QoS (due to the one-hop nature of
D2D transactions), and it is much easier to be estimated
in practice. For instance, if the minimal possible delay for
transmitting a given-size packet over a D2D link is 10 ms
(computed using datasheet), and the actual per-packet delay
is 40 ms (measured online), then the QoS value can be
normalized as qab = 10=40 = 0:25.
Credibility: The credibility estimation between encoun-
tered devices is important for the evaluation of current
behavior of each other, considering their historical knowl-
edge. In practice, it is reasonable for a person to consider
a stranger credible if their judges to any common third
party are similar. Inspired by this, we estimate cab based on
the comparability of contact histories of both device a and
device b. Without loss of generality, let device a’s contact
history Ea be a set of devices that a has paired with during
a trust management cycle regulated by the BS. For each
device x 2 Ea, a value eax that denotes the percentage of
positive ratings from a to x is also maintained by a, which
is recorded in a vector a according to the encountering
order of device x. eax will be refreshed according to the
rating from device a to device x whenever they finish a
D2D transaction. Specifically, cab is defined as:
cab = (s
2
ab + (1  )d2ab)wab; (3)
where sab is the similarity between percentages of positive
ratings separately replied by a and b to other devices, dab
is the relative diversity of percentages of positive ratings
separately replied by a and b to other devices,  within the
range of [0; 1] is used to adjust the focus of the credibility
estimation, and wab is the damping factor that is inversely
proportion of the intimacy between a and b.
In Eq.(3), sab and dab are defined as:
sab = 1 
sP
x2Eab(eax   ebx)2
jEabj ; (4)
dab = 1  jH(a) H(b)j ; (5)
where Eab = Ea \ Eb, and H() is calculated as:
H() =
sP
16y6dim()(y   (y+1)moddim())2
dim()
; (6)
where dim() is ’s dimensions, and y is ’s yth entry. wab
is used to restrict the credibility estimation between devices
that contact more frequently than normal, which is defined
as:
wab =
8><>:
1 if ab = 0
 cw(ab=)2 + 1 if 0 < ab 6 b
p
1=cwc
0 if ab > b
p
1=cwc
; (7)
where parameter cw determines the sensitivity of credibility
damping, ab is the transaction count between a and b, and
 is the average transaction count of all devices within a
trust management cycle regulated by the BS.
Rating: The rating indicates the satisfactory of a device
on the behavior of its peer device in the current D2D
transaction, which is determined by the comparison of the
QoS and credibility of the current transaction with that of
historical transactions with any device. For the transaction
between devices a and b:
rab =
(
1 if q2ab + (1  )c2ab > q2a + (1  )c2a
 1 if q2ab + (1  )c2ab < q2a + (1  )c2a
; (8)
where qa and ca are the EWMAs of historical QoS and
credibility that are locally updated by device a after each
transaction, and  within the range of [0; 1] is used to adjust
the focus of the rating decision.
Transaction Type: The type of the current transaction is
profiled to estimate the trustworthiness of a device fulfilling
D2D requests from different type of MCS tasks respectively.
For a normalized and comparable profiling, we de-
fine a as a jN j-dimensional vector to represent a D2D
transaction that is initiated from device a. If the current
transaction is a type-n transaction, the nth entry of a is
a positive value within the range of (0; 1], while all other
entries are 0. The value of the nth entry indicates resources
(computing/communicating) that are contributed by such a
transaction, e.g. bandwidth, which is determined according
to the criteria regulated by the BS.
4.3 Device Trustworthiness Adjustment at the BS
According to the uploaded receipts, the BS can estimate the
behavior of a device in a D2D transaction. For instance, for
the ith transaction of a device a 2 D (with its peer device b),
the BS can obtain qab, cab, rba and a from a’s receipt.
From the BS’s perspective, one more thing should be
considered is that D2D transactions required by different
crowdsourcing tasks lead to different device trustvalue ad-
justment patterns (i.e. which end of the transaction should
have a trustvalue adjustment). For instance, for an out-
sourced collaborative computing task, both ends of the D2D
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transaction should have trustvalue adjustments because of
their equal contributions to task offloading.
Without loss of generality, for a, the trustvalue ad-
justment pattern pa is defined as an element of set P =
f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0); (1; 1)g that indicates whether the ini-
tiator (indicated by the 1st entry, role ra = (1; 0)) or the
peer (indicated by the 2nd entry, role ra = (0; 1)) should
have a trustvalue adjustment. Let  be the whole set of the
transaction types (). It is viable for the BS to establish a
mapping:
f : ! P (9)
that indicates which end of the transaction should have a
trustvalue adjustment according to the transaction type.
In this case, for the BS, the behavior estimation of device
a in its ith transaction ta(i) in Eq.(1) is computed as
(omitting index i for concision):
ta = qabcabrbaf(a)raa: (10)
4.4 Trustvalue Bootstrapping
For the bootstrapping of the device trustvalue, an initial
value of e 1 (g(0)) is issued when the device joins the MCS.
Besides, for two devices freshly encountered (e.g. a and b,
where jEaj, jEbj or jEabj is 0), the weight factor of rating 
is set as 1 to neglect the credibility factor. Therefore, any
device that freshly joins the MCS will not be starved and
is guaranteed a fair probability to be involved as long as
behaving well in D2D transactions.
4.5 Discussion on the Trust Estimation Method
In this subsection, we firstly provide justifications for the
trustvalue definition and device behavior profiling, then we
conduct comparisons between our method and the Josang
model [38] in the D2D-enabled MCS scenario.
4.5.1 Device Trustvalue Accumulation
Intuitively, we estimate the trustworthiness of a device
performing D2D transactions according to its historical be-
haviors. The trustvalue of a device is determined by the
accumulation of its quantified behavior profiles (Eq.(1)).
Considering that any freshly joint device with continu-
ously positive (negative) behaviors deserves a rapid trust-
value enhancement (decrement), and that the trustvalue it-
self should be normalized for effective comparisons, we use
a type of sigmoid function, i.e. the Gompertz Function [37]
g(x) = e e
 cgx (see Fig.A1 (a) in Appendix A.1), to map
the behavior accumulation to the device trustvalue. Any
other function with similar properties, e.g. the Logistic Func-
tion [39] l(x) = 1=(1 + e clx) (see Fig.A1 (a) in Appendix
A.1), is also applicable in trustworthiness mapping.
One thing should be noted is that the value of cg deter-
mines the sensitivity of trustvalue variations. We provide an
instance for cg determination in Appendix A.1.
4.5.2 Device Credibility Estimation
Intuitively, to stimulate more D2D transactions, devices
with benign and stable behaviors in extensive active scopes
should be guaranteed higher credibilities.
The first metric of credibility estimation is the compa-
rability of the behavior profiles separatively maintained by
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Fig. 2: Comparisons between TDP and the Josang Model.
both ends of the transaction. We assume that devices strictly
following MCS regulations receive relatively similar ratings
from different devices, then the comparability is quantified
by the similarity (Eq.(4)) and the relative diversity (Eq.(5)) of
their contact histories. Specifically, the similarity estimation
encourages devices to objectively reflect other’s behavior
through justifiable ratings, while that the diversity estima-
tion restricts devices from downgrading other’s trustvalue
with extreme or discriminative ratings.
Besides, to prevent the potential trustvalue boost caused
by massive meaningless D2D transactions between collusive
devices, the intimacy between both ends of a transaction
is treated as a damping factor of their credibility (Eq.(7)),
i.e. suspiciously frequent contacts lead to rapid credibility
decreases. We use a type of monotonic descending function,
i.e. a quadratic function w() =  cw(=)2+1, to represent
the relation between the device contact number  and the
damping factor w (see Fig.A2 (a) in Appendix A.2). Any
other function with similar properties, e.g. a cubic function
w() =  cw(=)3 + 1 (see Fig.A2 (a) in Appendix A.2), is
also applicable.
One thing should be noted is that the value of cw deter-
mines the sensitivity of credibility damping on the device
intimacy. We provide an instance for cw determination in
Appendix A.2.
4.5.3 Comparison with the Josang Trust Model
In this part, we compare the effectiveness of our trust
estimation method and that of the Josang trust model [38],
one of the most representative trust estimation methods, in
D2D-enabled MCS scenarios.
Specifically, the Josang model [38] leverages the beta
probability density function to map the reputation of self-
interested entities, whose expectation is treated as entity
trustworthiness on fulfilling future transactions. According
to [38], we calculate the trustvalue based on the Josang
model of each device a after its ith transaction as:
t0a(i) =
Countp(i) + 1
Countp(i) + Countn(i) + 2
; (11)
where Countp(i) and Countn(i) denote the number of
positive and negative ratings that a receives after its ith
transaction, respectively.
For comparison, we conducted two sets of numerical
simulations to study the impact of the positive rating per-
centage and the D2D profile on the accuracy and sensitivity
of trustworthiness mapping of our method and the Josang
model. For each round of simulation, we recorded the
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trustvalue variation (t for our method, and t0 for the Josang
model) of a single device a in 200 transactions. For our
method, we set t0 = e 1, and t was updated after each
transaction based on the rating and D2D profiles (i.e. QoS
and credibility); for the Josang model, we set t00 = 1, and t
0
was updated after each transaction based on the rating only.
In the first set of simulations, we set that device a got
a positive rating at different probabilities (i.e. 50%, 20%
and 80%) and a random D2D profile within the range of
[0; 1] in a transaction. As shown in Fig.2 (a), both models
can maintain a distinguishable trustvalue with a similar
adjusting trend. However, their sensitivities are obviously
different: for more extreme cases (i.e. 20% and 80%), our
method guarantees a gradual accumulation of the device
trustworthiness, whereas the Josang model just presents a
rapid trust convergence; for the neutral case (i.e. 50%), our
device trustworthiness is adjusted more sensitively because
of more objective device behavior estimations.
In the second set of simulations, we set that device a
got a positive rating with a 50% probability and a random
D2D profile within different ranges (i.e. [0; 1], [0; 0:5] and
[0; 0:2]) in a transaction. As shown in Fig.2 (b), TDPmanages
to maintain a more distinguishable and sensitive trustvalue
compared to the Josang model. In D2D-enabled MCSs, it is
not objective to estimate the trustworthiness of a device only
based on ratings from other peers. Counting more detailed
information into trustworthiness estimation not only guar-
antees a better objectivity but also provides devices a fair
chance to attract more transactions with better behaviors.
5 THE TRUSTWORTHY DEVICE PAIRING (TDP)
SCHEME
With the accurate trustworthiness estimated by the method
in Section 4, in this section, we develop TDP to realize rapid,
user-transparent, and trustworthy device pairing for D2D-
enabled MCSs.
5.1 Overview
Considering the security threats in Subsection 3.2, TDP
establishes a Certificate-Less Public Key Cryptography (CL-
PKC) [40] framework to issue a unique private-public key
pair to each registered device as the D2D credential. Since
the credential is collaboratively generated by the BS and
the registering device, it is verifiable to any other registered
device as well as the BS.
Based on the credential, any pair of registered devices
encountered can negotiate a shared key spontaneously with-
out contacting the BS, which introduces no extra labor
compared with existing device pairing methods. Besides,
because a part of the credential is privately held by the
device only, the ‘benign but curious’ BS cannot restore such
shared keys to decrypt the transaction contents. Moreover,
according to the D2D receipts authenticated by the cre-
dential, participating devices of D2D transactions can have
justifiable trustvalue adjustments from the BS based on their
behaviors, which will guarantee a well-behaving device a
fair advantage in peer selections in future D2D transactions.
Specifically, TDP consists of three components: device
registration, device pairing, and device trustvalue management,
whose basic procedure is illustrated in Fig.3. Specific opera-
tions are presented as follows.
Fig. 3: Architecture of TDP.
TABLE 1: System Parameters of TDP.
Parameter Meaning Note
E
an elliptic curve on
a finite filed Fq
treated as a cyclic
addition group Gq ; q: a
large prime as the
group order; P : the
generator of Gq
x
a random positive
integer < q
(x 2R Zq )
the master private key,
only possessed by the
BS
Ppub
a point on E
(Ppub = xP )
the master public key;
xP : the point
multiplication on E
h0;1;2
one-way hash
functions
h0 : f0; 1g ! Z;
h1 : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g;
h2 : f0; 1g ! Z
5.2 Device Registration
In this process, the BS generates and issues a D2D credential
to each registering device.
For the system initialization, the BS determines all sys-
tem parameters in Table 1. Then, the parameter set 
 =
fFq; Gq; P; Ppub; h0; h1; h2g and the bootstrapping trustval-
ue t0 are deployed in the crowdsourcing application.
To join the MCS, personal mobile devices need to install
the crowdsourcing application and register to the BS. With-
out loss of generality, let device a register to the BS. Specific
operations (Step 1.1-1.3 in Fig.3) are demonstrated in Fig.4,
where the operator‘k’ denotes the concatenation operation.
Fig. 4: Device Registration (Step 1 in Fig.3).
Here, device a determines its local partial key pair
(xa; Pa), where Pa = xaP . Then the BS extracts an authen-
ticated partial key pair (da; Ra) according to Pa. Finally,
(ska; pka), where ska = (da; xa) and pka = (Pa; Ra),
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Fig. 5: Device Pairing (Step 2 in Fig.3).
is treated as a’s credential. Meanwhile, the BS records
(a; ra; da; Pa; ta).
5.3 Device Pairing
In this process, any pair of registered devices encountered
use their credentials to negotiate a shared key for a secure
D2D connection.
To accomplish a specific kind of D2D transaction, the ini-
tiator a selects a peer b among multiple available candidates
considering their device trustvalues and other states (e.g.
D2D channel signal strength). Then a and b start the device
pairing. Specific operations (Step 2 in Fig.3) are demon-
strated in Fig.5, where ‘’ denotes the xor operation, and
Enc(x; y) and Dec(x; y) denote the symmetric encryption
and decryption with x as the key and y as the plaintext.
The shared key kab is generated according to a and b’s cre-
dentials. la(b) and na(b) are random numbers guaranteeing
the freshness of kab and the Challenge-Response messages
C and F , respectively.
5.4 Device Trustvalue Management
In this process, each end of a finished D2D transaction gen-
erates a verifiable receipt to profile the current transaction,
which is uploaded to the BS for trustvalue adjustment.
D2D Transaction Receipt Generation: After the ith D2D
transaction of device a (the jth of device b), a and b generate
receipts that record both the transaction information and the
profiles of each other’s behavior.
Specific operations (Step 3.1 in Fig.3) are demonstrated
in Fig.6. Note that all interactions between a and b are
encrypted by kab (the symmetric cryptography operation
(Enc;Dec) and the transaction indexes (i; j) are omitted for
conciseness). Here, a and b exchange the contact histories
Ea and Eb (together with a and b) to calculate each other’s
credibility cab = cba. Then, considering the QoS of the D2D
link qab = qba and the knowledge of historical transactions
qa(b) and ca(b), device a(b) generates a rating rab(ba) to
evaluate b(a)’s behavior. For the integrity and accountability
concerns, the rating is encrypted before exchanged that only
the generator and the BS can decrypt. T1;2;3 are signatures
that are generated using the credentials of a, b, and the
Fig. 6: D2D Receipt Generation (Step 3 in Fig.3).
BS combined, while t0 is used to guarantee the signature
freshness. Reab(ba) is the receipt of device a(b).
Trustvalue Adjustment: Since D2D receipts will expire
after a certain period of time, participating devices will
upload locally verified receipts to the BS (Step 3.2.1 in Fig.3)
when there is a cost-effective Internet access (e.g. free WiFi).
When device a uploads Reab, the BS can get the
transaction information and behavior profiles including
a; b; cab; qab;ab and rba = Dec(db; erba). To verify the
validity of Reab, the BS computes
h0b = h2(erbakcabkqabkab); (12)
then, according to the partial key pairs of a and b, the BS
verifies whether
dah
0
b
db
T2b = T1b (13)
holds. If Eq.(13) holds, the receipt is valid.
With a verified receipt, according to Eq.(1) and (10), the
trustvalue of device a can be adjusted.
For the integrity and authenticity concerns, the BS gen-
erates a signature for each adjusted device trustvalue. For
device a discussed above, the BS generates
T4bs =
lbstau
x+ ra
;
T5bs = lbsP;
(14)
where lbs 2R Zq is used to guarantee the signature fresh-
ness, ta is the adjusted trustvalue of device a, and u is a
jN j-dimensional unit vector.
Then takT4bskT5bs is replied to device a (Step 3.2.2 in
Fig.3). Any device that encounters a can verify whether
T4bs(Ppub +Ra) = tauT5bs (15)
holds. If Eq.(15) holds, the trustvalue is valid.
Until now, TDP realizes the secure device pairing and
the online trust management in D2D-enabled MCSs.
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5.5 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we conduct theoretical analysis to
demonstrate the security intensity of TDP confronting po-
tential threats in D2D-enabled MCSs (Subsection 3.2). Note
that we consider the Computational Diffie-Hellman Prob-
lem on Elliptic Curves (ECDHP) [41] as intractable for any
adversary with finite resources, which is clarified as follows:
Let E be an elliptic curve on a finite field Fq , whose
generator is P : given P , aP and bP , where a; b 2 Zq , the
computation of abP is intractable.
5.5.1 Confronting CO Attacks
Adversaries launch CO attacks to compromise the device
pairing process between registered devices. Without loss of
generality, let an adversarym 2M (M D) be a registered
device, who has a verifiable credential (skm; pkm), that tries
to compromise the device pairing process between benign
devices a; b 2 D. In Appendixes B.1 to B.3, we demonstrate
TDP’s immunity to all CO attacks in Subsection 3.2, which
indicates its comparable security intensity to the off-the-
shelf protocols [24], [25].
5.5.2 Confronting TO Attacks
Adversaries launch TO attacks to manipulate D2D traffics.
Without loss of generality, let a set of adversariesM D be
multiple registered devices with verifiable credentials. They
try to, either independently or collusively, attract unfair
D2D transaction requests than benign devices in D do. In
Appendixes B.4 to B.6, we demonstrate TDP’s resistance
to all TO attacks in Subsection 3.2, which can effectively
prevent traffic manipulations in D2D-enabled MCSs.
5.6 Case Studies
In this part, we conduct two case studies to demonstrate
how to apply TDP to mobile collaborative computing
tasks [7], [8] and mobile crowdsensing tasks [4], [9], [21].
Collaborative Computing Tasks: In a mobile crowd-
computing task, the BS outsources computing requests to
registered devices through the crowdsourcing application.
Let device a accept the task and recruit peer devices for col-
laborative computing. By investigating the status of nearby
devices, including the trustvalue in terms of collaborative
computing, a determines its peer devices and then conducts
device pairing with each one of them.
During the pairing process between a and one of the
recruited devices b, both of them use registered credentials
(sk; pk) to negotiate, generate and verify a shared key
kab, which is used to secure D2D communications during
the task. After the computing task, recruited devices reply
ratings to demonstrate their satisfactory. To generate the
receipt, a and b exchange Ea and Eb using the established
secure connection. Then receipts from a and b, i.e. Reab and
Reba, are generated using the credentials of a, b and the BS.
When there is a cost-effective access to the Internet (e.g.
free WiFi at work, home or a cafe), a and b separately upload
the receipts to the BS. After authenticating the receipts,
the BS will adjust their trustvalues according to Eq.(1) and
(10). For the collaborative computing, since both ends of
the transaction equally contribute, both ends will have a
trustvalue adjustment (i.e. f(ab) = (1; 1)). Then the BS
generates signatures for their adjusted trustvalues. Finally,
Fig. 7: D2D-Enabled MCS Prototype Illustration.
TABLE 2: Implementation Details of TDP.
Schemes BTDP WTDP
D2D
Channel Bluetooth v3.0 [25] WiFi direct v1.5 [24]
ROM 4.20 MB 7.47 MB
RAM 19.29 MB 23.54 MB
Cryptography
Primitives
ECC-secp160r1,
AES-128 [42], [43]
ECC-secp160r1,
AES-128 [42], [43]
the adjusted trustvalues and signatures are replied to a and
b for future D2D transactions.
Mobile Crowdsensing Tasks: In a mobile crowdsensing
task, the BS outsources a sensing request to a participating
device a to collect and report sensing data. Perhaps there are
Internet-access or cost issues and a requires a peer device to
deliver its data packets in a D2D manner. By investigating
the status of nearby devices, including the trustvalue in
terms of packet delivery, a selects a peer device b and
conducts device pairing with it.
The device pairing and D2D receipt generation in such a
mobile crowdsensing task are similar to that in the last case,
therefore we make no further discussion for conciseness.
For the packet delivery, only the device that initiates
the data transmission, which is device a in this case, will
have an ‘actual’ trustvalue adjustment (i.e. f(ab) = (1; 0)).
Therefore the peer device that receives packets will try
further deliveries to get a trustvalue adjustment. Then the
BS generates a signature for a’s adjusted trustvalue. Finally,
the adjusted trustvalue and signatures are replied to a and
b (no change) for future D2D transactions.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of TDP by both
prototype experiments and trace-driven simulations.
6.1 Real-world Experiments
As shown in Fig.7, we constructed a MSC prototype consist-
ing of:
 A PC based BS: A Dell OPTIPLEX 9010 with Linux
Mint 17.3-64bit, Intel Core i5-3470 3.2GHz CPU, and
8GB RAM.
 Five Android devices: Google Nexus5 with Android
4.4.4, Qualcomm Snapdragon 800 2.3GHz CPU, 2GB
RAM, and 16GB ROM.
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Fig. 8: Off-the-Shelf Pairing Time Comparison.
Devices can communicate with the BS through WiFi and
communicate with each other through D2D channels.
As shown in Table 2, we implemented two versions of
TDP as independent security services upon user-transparent
but insecure D2D connections on Android mobile devices:
BTDP is based on a Bluetooth connection in the JustWork
mode [25], and WTDP is based on a WiFi direct connection
in the ServiceDiscovery mode [24] whose mandatory
manual authentication of WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) is
blocked. Our implementation adopted the cryptography
primitives in [42], [43].
In prototype experiments, we evaluated the performance
of device pairing and trust management processes.
6.1.1 Device Pairing Study
In this set of experiments, we evaluated the performance of
TDP device pairing process. Specifically, we considered pair-
ing time, i.e. the time consumed from the device discovery to
the establishment of a shared key, as the performance metric
to measure the pairing speed. We compared BTDP and
WTDP with original Bluetooth and WiFi direct with default
settings 1. As shown in Fig.8 (a) and (b), 20 pairing time
samples were collected for BTDP (and original Bluetooth)
and WTDP (and original WiFi direct) respectively.
Fig.8 (a) shows that both the mean and standard devi-
ation (std) of the pairing time of BTDP are smaller than
that of original Bluetooth pairing. This demonstrates that
the pairing process of BTDP is not only faster, but also more
stable, in comparison with Bluetooth. The autonomous key
negotiation of BTDP avoids undetermined delays caused by
manual confirmations in original Bluetooth pairing. It short-
ens the pairing time and limits any potential fluctuations
other than that caused by Bluetooth device discovery itself.
From Fig.8 (b), we can see that WTDP outperforms WiFi
Direct in terms of pairing stability (by avoiding potential
manual operation delays), but its average pairing speed is s-
lower. Different from the BTDP implemented on the insecure
but autonomous Bluetooth connections (i.e. the JustWork
mode of Bluetooth [25]), there exists no such WiFi direct
connecting mode available for WTDP 2. Therefore, we had
to implement WTDP in the ServiceDiscoverymode [24]
of WiFi direct for autonomous device discovery, and block
the mandatory manual confirmation in the AndroidWifip2p
1. Note that we did our best to shorten the reactive time whenever
there was a physical interaction (i.e. manual confirmations for pairing
requests: PIN comparison, pairing button click).
2. The default WiFi direct pairing is in the ActiveScan mode [24],
which requires both users to scan simultaneously for device discovery.
TABLE 3: User-Transparent Pairing Time.
Related
Schemes
Miettinen
et al. [15]
Truong et
al. [16]
Lentz et
al. [26]
TDP
(B/W)
Secret
Extraction/s 120 10 No need No need
Key Negoti-
ation/s
Not con-
sidered
Not con-
sidered
Not
specified 7.25/9.72
Fluctuation/% Notspecified
Not
specified 0-100 10.2/15.4
service. This inefficient implementation somehow emulated
insecure but autonomous WiFi direct connections, but leading
to significant performance degradation of our approach, i.e.
each recorded pairing time of WTDP consists of both an
entire round of original WiFi direct pairing and our upper-
layer security service.
Table 3 compares the pairing time of TDP and state-
of-the-art user-transparent device pairing approaches that
are promising in implementing D2D-enabled MCSs. The
proximity-based approaches in [15] and [16] collect con-
textual data for 120s and 10s respectively to generate key
materials, and the time for key negotiation and authentica-
tion is not considered. The non-interactive approach in [26]
pairs up two devices based on a series of asynchronous
broadcasts of device public key materials with a 60s or 120s
interval. it is possible that a pairing time fluctuation up to
100% will be introduced. Compared with them, TDP has no
requirement on contextual information collection or device
proximity, and its pairing fluctuation is well restricted with-
out the synchronization concern.
6.1.2 Trust Management Study
This set of experiments for trust management evaluation
were based on BTDP pairing. Specifically, we adopted the
average RSSI of the Bluetooth channel measured by both
ends at the start of device pairing process as the metric
for QoS estimation. The RSSI values were normalized, i.e.
proportionally mapped from the range of [-100 dBm, 0dBm]
to [0, 1]. According to Eq.(8), the rating that reflects the
device behavior during a D2D transaction can be either QoS-
driven or Credibility-Driven by adjusting the value of .
Therefore, we conducted two sets of experiments that sepa-
rately focused on QoS ( = 0:8) and Credibility ( = 0:2),
meanwhile we monitored the variation of device trustvalue
and the direction of D2D traffic within the system.
Each set of experiments had 40 D2D transactions. At
an experiment round, registered devices (Devices 1-5) took
turns to post a transaction request and autonomously paired
with the most trustworthy device that was visible. One of
the devices (in turn) was excluded from candidates for a
single round. During the experiments, only the trustvalue of
transactions that lead to trust variations at the peer side was
considered. We set the average transaction count  = 30. As
a result, the trust accumulation sensitivity cg = 0:5 and the
damping sensitivity cw = 0:5 according to Eq.(A1) and (A2)
respectively. The credibility sensitivity  = 0:5.
Fig.9 shows the results of the QoS-driven experiments.
Here, each device was carried by a student roaming around
the laboratory to introduce QoS variations. The majority of
D2D requests were attracted by Devices 2-4. For Devices
3 and 4, a higher QoS boosts their trustvalue and vice
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Fig. 10: Credibility-Driven Trust Management.
versa. Moreover, since Device 2 has a trustvalue boost at the
beginning due to our device encountering setting, it stays
in a dominant position all the time compared with others.
Even it provides lower QoS for a while, its trustvalue has no
severely but only a slightly drop since almost all of contact
histories of others are with Device 2. To avoid such kind of
monopoly,  should be well adjusted to offer devices with
inherently lower QoS a chance for a trustvalue boost with
higher credibilities.
Fig.10 shows the results of Credibility-driven experi-
ments. Here, Devices 4 and 5 were set to reply negative
ratings in all D2D transactions to introduce credibility dif-
ferences. The majority of D2D requests were attracted by
Devices 2 and 3. Devices 4 and 5 only attracted two requests
because of low credibilities. For Devices 2 and 3, transaction-
s with a credibility around 0:1 were conducted with Device
4 or 5. The influence of ratings with abnormal credibilities
on the trustvalue of Devices 2 and 3 is nearly negligible.
When they conduct transactions with other devices, a higher
credibility boosts their trustvalue and vice versa. Actually,
to encourage users refining their QoS,  should be well
adjusted to offer devices with lower credibilities a chance
for a trustvalue boost with higher QoS.
6.2 Trace-Driven Simulations
To study the practical performance of TDP in larger-scale
MCSs, we constructed extensive trace-driven simulations
based on OMNeT++ 4.6 [44], by using real human mobility
data collected from the IEEE Infocom’05 conference [45] and
the ACM Sigcomm’09 conference [46]. The settings of these
two sets of simulations are as follows:
 The Infocom’05 Trace was used for constructing a
D2D-enabled MCS with 41 registered devices. Here,
the connecting time of D2D channels between en-
countered devices was used to estimate the D2D
QoS. According to the simulation result with no at-
tacker, we set the average transaction count  = 110.
Therefore sensitivities cg = 0:14 and cw = 0:5 ac-
cording to Eq.(A1) and (A2) respectively. For Eq.(3),
we set  = 0:5 to equally treat the similarity and
diversity, and  = 0:1 for Eq.(8) to compensate the
inherent unfairness on the device QoS. According to
duration of the Infocom’05 trace, each round of sim-
ulations lasted for 30000 simulation seconds, which
was treated as a single trustvalue management cycle.
 The Sigcomm’09 Trace has nearly twice node records
than the Infocom’05 trace. By using this trace, a D2D-
enabled MCS with 76 devices was constructed to
evaluate the scalability of TDP. Here, the volume of
data transmitted through D2D channels was used
to estimate the D2D QoS. In this set of simulations,
we set  = 31, cg = 0:5, cw = 0:5,  = 0:5 and
 = 0:1. Each round of simulations lasted for 15000
simulation seconds.
In all simulations, devices can spontaneously register to
the BS and publish or accept D2D requests. The trustvalue
was treated as the unique metric for peer selections. Mean-
while, since the type of D2D transactions has no impact on
the performance of TDP, we only considered the trustvalue
of transactions that lead to trust variations at the peer side.
6.2.1 Performance Metrics
Since the goal of TO attackers in D2D-enabledMCSs is to get
unfair advantages in peer selections over benign devices,
we collected the following two metrics to evaluate the
effectiveness of TDP against potential traffic manipulations:
 Device Trustvalue, the time-varying device trustval-
ue, whose cumulative distribution indicates whether
malicious behaviors of TO attackers downgrade
the trustworthiness of benign devices. Ideally, TDP
should be able to automatically downgrade the trust-
value of TO attackers without disturbing (downgrad-
ing) the trustvalue of benign devices;
 False Positive Transactions Numbers, the number
of transactions attracted by TO attackers from benign
devices, which quantifies the impact of traffic manip-
ulations of TO attackers. Ideally, TDP should be able
to automatically limit the number of transactions
attracted by TO attackers.
In our simulations, participating devices in the MCS
were divided into two categories: attackers and benign
devices, whose trustvalue and false positive transactions
were recorded separately for analysis. For comparison, we
ran two simulations with no attacker for both the Infocom
and Sigcomm traces (i.e. the original scenario). For the rest of
the paper, we use the Cumulative Distribution Figure (CDF)
to present the trustvalue of both benign devices and TO
attackers, and we use the Time Variance Figure (TVF) to
present the number of false positive transactions attracted
by TO attackers.
6.2.2 Impact of Attacker Percentage
In this set of simulations, different percentages (5%, 10%,
and 15%) of registered devices were randomly selected as
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Fig. 11: Impact of Different Attacker Percentages (Infocom).
attackers that were continuously launching TO attacks. The
results of the Infocom and Sigcomm simulations are shown
in Fig.11 and Fig.12 respectively.
For both sets of simulations, the impact of TO2 attacks
is well eliminated in all three scenarios: the average trust-
value of benign devices is not obviously affected compared
with the original scenario (e.g. benign-TO2 (0:46=9:5%")
vs benign-none (0:42) in Fig.11 (a)). However, the average
trustvalue of attackers is severely downgraded because of
their TO2 attacks (e.g. attacker-TO2 (0:13=50%#) vs attacker-
none (0:26) in Fig.11 (a)). Meanwhile, the false positive
transaction number also decreases when there are TO2 at-
tacks (e.g. benign-TO2 (1612=13:5%#) vs benign-none (1864)
in Fig.11 (b)).
For the Infocom simulations, the impact of TO3 attacks
is well eliminated in all three scenarios. For the Sigcom-
m simulations, when the attacker percentage is 15%, the
impact of TO3 attacks cannot be neglected. However, in
general, it is well accepted that devices in the MCS should
form a relatively good community with small percentage
of malicious devices (e.g. 4% in [47] and 10% in [48]). For
the scenario with the attacker percentage up to 10%, TDP
manages to effectively eliminate the impact of TO3 attacks.
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Fig. 12: Impact of Different Attacker Percentages (Sigcomm).
6.2.3 Impact of Attackers with Different Properties
In this set of simulations, considering that TO attacks from
more trustworthy or popular devices may cause deeper im-
pacts, we specifically selected a fixed percentage of devices
with different properties as continuous TO attackers, i.e. top
7% devices in average trustvalue (TopTV) or top 7% devices
in transaction count (TopTC) in the original scenario. The
results of the Infocom and Sigcomm simulations are shown
in Fig.13 and Fig.14 respectively.
For both sets of simulations, the impact of TO2 attacks
is well eliminated in all two scenarios: there is no obvious
impact on the average trustvalue of benign devices (e.g.
benign-TO2 (0:41=9:8%") vs benign-none (0:37) in Fig.13
(a)), while the average trustvalue of attackers is severely
downgraded (e.g. attacker-TO2 (0:44=48:2%#) vs attacker-
none (0:85) in Fig.13 (a)), and the number of false positive
transactions also decreases correspondingly (e.g. benign-
TO2 (6737=29:7%#) vs benign-none (9579) in Fig.13 (b)).
For the Infocom simulations, the impact of TO3 at-
tacks from TopTV devices is well eliminated according to
Fig.13 (a) and (b). In the TopTC scenario, attackers have
a boost in terms of the average trustvalue (i.e. attacker-
TO3 (0:53=65:6%") vs attacker-none (0:32) in Fig.13 (c))
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Fig. 13: Impact of Attackers with Different Properties (Infocom).
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Fig. 14: Impact of Attackers with Different Properties (Sigcomm).
and the number of attracted transactions (i.e. attacker-TO3
(8758=9:9%") vs attacker-none (7969) in Fig.13 (d)). Howev-
er, the impact on the average trustvalue of benign devices
is negligible (i.e. benign-TO3 (0:40=7:0%#) vs benign-none
(0:43) in Fig.13 (c)). For the Sigcomm simulations with TO3
attacks, the average trustvalue of attackers remains similar,
and the number of attracted transactions has a slightly boost
in all two scenarios. In fact, the impact of TO3 attacks
on benign devices is difficult to be restricted only when
the collusive attackers possess predominant popularities
(i.e. 6%1:17% = 512:8% of the average popularity of benign
devices for the Infocom TopTC scenario, 4:42%1:05% = 421% and
5:66%
1:02% = 555% for the Sigcomm TopTV and TopTC scenarios
respectively). However, considering it is irrational for the
most popular devices to collude in reality because of the
low cost-efficiency, TDP manages to effectively eliminate
the impact of TO3 attacks from devices with rationally
advanced trustworthiness or popularity.
6.2.4 Impact of Attacking Intensity
In this set of simulations, to study the impact of TO attacks
with different intensities, we randomly selected a fixed
percentage (7%) of devices as attackers that launch TO
attacks in each D2D transaction with different probabilities
(i.e. 0, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 100%). The results of the Infocom
and Sigcomm simulations are shown in Fig.15 and Fig.16
respectively.
For the Infocom simulations, the impacts of both TO2
and TO3 attacks are well eliminated: compared with the
original scenario, the average trustvalue of attackers is in
inverse proportion to the attack intensity (e.g. attacker-
30% (0:66=22:4%#), attacker-50% (0:49=42:4%#) vs attacker-
none (0:85) in Fig.15 (a)). The number of false positive
transactions also decreases in direct proportion to the at-
tack intensity (e.g. benign-30% (8047=16:0%#), benign-50%
(7156=25:3%#) vs attacker-none (9579) in Fig.15 (b)).
For the Sigcomm simulations, the results are basically the
same except for the 30% scenarios. For both 30% TO2 and
TO3 attacks, attackers have a slightly boost in terms of the
average trustvalue and the number of attracted transactions.
In fact, since the device contact in the Sigcomm trace is
relatively sparse compared to the Infocom trace (i.e. 31 vs
110 in terms of the average transaction count of participating
devices), system’s reaction to TO attacks is correspondingly
slower. However, the impacts of the 30% TO attacks on the
trustvalue of benign devices are negligible (e.g. benign-30%
(0:85=1:2%") vs benign-none (0:86) in Fig.16 (a)). Therefore,
TDP manages to effectively eliminate the impact of TO
attacks with different intensities.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop TDP, a rapid, user-transparent,
and trustworthy device pairing scheme for Mobile Crowd-
souring Systems (MCS) with opportunistic Device-to-Device
(D2D) communications. We first develop a formal method to
estimate the trustworthiness of participating devices at real-
time. Then, we propose a CL-PKC based credential frame-
work that allows each encountered device to spontaneously
establish a secure D2D connection with the most trustwor-
thy peer nearby. We theoretically prove that TDP manages
to achieve a comparable security intensity with the off-the-
shelf protocols and the immunity to the TO attacks that are
not considered by existing approaches. Through real-world
experiments using Android devices, we show that TDP
outperforms existing approaches in terms of pairing speed
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Fig. 15: Impact of Attacks with Different Intensities (Infocom).
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Fig. 16: Impact of Attacks with Different Intensities (Sigcomm).
and stability. In addition, extensive trace-driven simulation
results verify that TDP manages to effectively prevent the
traffic manipulation of TO attackers in large-scale MCSs.
Interesting future work is to apply TDP to specific MCS
applications such as D2D-enabled mobile social networking
and mobile cloud computing.
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